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The financial and environmental costs and benefits for Norwegian electric car subsidies: Are 
they good public policy?   
 
 
Abstract 
 
Norway is the current per-capita leader in battery-electric vehicle (BEV) sales due in 
large part to generous government subsidies for BEV buyers.  These subsidies are designed to 
support the government’s goal of electrifying 20% of Norway’s vehicle fleet to reduce national 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Norway is not alone in its support of vehicle electrification, as many 
public policy makers around the world also use EV subsidies as a means of achieving emission 
reduction goals.  Despite their widespread presence, however, very little analysis has examined 
the cost of the subsidies relative to the value of the consequent environmental and social benefits.  
This research uses a variety of scenarios to calculate the costs and benefits of Norwegian EV 
supports, and the general finding is that subsidy costs are much higher than the environmental 
benefits, resulting in negative ROIs.  Implications of the Norwegian results for public policy 
makers in other countries are then discussed.    
 
Keywords: electric car, government subsidy, return-on-investment, greenhouse gas emissions, 
market failure 
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1.0 Introduction 
Although many governments around the world are encouraging vehicle electrification as 
a means of achieving energy security and environmental policy goals, battery-electric vehicles 
(BEV) remain a niche in most markets (Lomborg 2013; Mock and Yang, 2014).  In contrast to 
the generally slow BEV adoption rates globally, Norway became the first national market where 
a BEV was the best selling new vehicle, as the Tesla S model topped the September 2013 sales 
chart (Dagenborg 2013).  Only a month later, the Nissan Leaf BEV was the best seller and on it’s 
way to becoming the 3rd best selling car model in Norway during 2013 (King 2013; OFV 2014).  
Norway was also the world leader in per capita BEV sales during 2013, where they captured 
almost 6% of the new car market due to a wide range of subsidies provided to BEV buyers 
including exemptions from purchase taxes, road tolls and parking fees, which has led some to 
call Norway the ‘Shangri-La of electric transportation’  (EVN 2014; Hockenos 2011; UNEP 
2014).   
Numerous studies have assessed the market attractiveness and environmental impact of 
green vehicles, and a common finding is that their adoption and consequent green benefits are 
hampered by unattractive high prices and performance deficits versus conventional gasoline and 
diesel fueled internal combustion vehicles (ICV) (Carlsson and Johannsson 2003; Delucchi and 
Lipman 2001; Olson, 2013a, 2015). As a consequence, other research has focused on how green 
vehicle handicaps might be offset by various types of government subsidies that can speed 
market acceptance and help achieve environmental policy goals (Beresteanu and Li 2011; 
Gallagher and Meuhlegger 2011; Klif 2006; Mock and Yang, 2014; Skerlos and Winebrake 
2010).  What are largely missing in such inquiries are attempts to calculate the costs of green 
vehicle subsidies relative to the value of the benefits they provide.  For example, Norwegian 
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public policy documents related to BEV goals and supports do not provide any subsidy return-
on-investment (ROI) calculations related to achieving desired environmental benefits (Holtsmark 
2012).  Given the negative publicity regarding a number of recent green technology bankruptcies 
involving firms receiving government financial and regulatory support, such as solar panel 
maker Solyndra and electric car producer Fisker, showing a positive environmental and 
economic payoff for government green policies could be an important means of maintaining 
political and public support (Muller 2013; Olson, 2013b).  The purpose of this study is to 
examine the cost effectiveness of Norwegian BEV subsidies in achieving the desired emission 
reductions that are the stated policy goal used to justify their implementation.  The findings 
suggest that the subsidies produce very expensive environmental benefits, and that other national 
governments are likely to find it economically and/or politically difficult to emulate Norwegian 
BEV policies and results.               
 
2.0 Government Justification for BEV Subsidies 
Carbon-based fuels burned by motor vehicles generate about 33% of man-made 
greenhouse gases in Norway, and are a key reason that electrification of vehicle fleets is seen by 
many public policy experts and environmentalists as an important means of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions and other pollutants (Climate Cure 2010).  Reflecting this viewpoint is the 
Norwegian government’s stated goal of achieving 20% electrification of the country’s vehicle 
fleet to help in reducing overall national greenhouse gas emissions 30% by 2020 (Climate Cure 
2010; Sovoll, Mathisen, and Jørgensen 2010).  For similar reasons, U.S. President Barack 
Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have each set a goal of putting one million 
electric vehicles on their nation’s roads by 2015 and 2020 respectively (DOE 2011; Spiegel 
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2012).  Such green public policy goals are frequently motivated by opinion polls that 
consistently find large majorities of citizens expressing strong support for environmental issues 
(Nisbett and Myers 2007).  Yet public policy must also deal with the reality that consumer 
preferences over time have increasingly favored larger and more powerful vehicles that consume 
higher quantities of raw materials and energy in their production and use (Olson, 2015).  For 
example, since the mid-1970s, the average weight and horsepower of American cars increased 
20% and 100% respectively, while in Norway (and Europe) the best selling VW Golf grew 57% 
heavier and 125% more powerful (Olson, 2013a).   
Thus a common theme in green technology adoption studies involving consumers is the 
presence of a value–action gap between the public’s almost universal pro-green attitudes and 
their much rarer pro-green behaviors.  This ‘demand-side’ value-action gap is widely attributed 
to the significant sacrifices that green technologies often require of users on conventional 
attributes (Olson, 2013a; Pujari et al., 2003).  For example, compared to conventional ICVs, 
BEVs are typically uncompetitive in price, driving range, and ‘refueling’ speed, and these 
limitations have proven to be unacceptable to the vast majority of car buyers (Massey 2013; 
Spiegel 2012).  Thus with limited market prospects, BEVs and other green technologies are often 
seen as unattractive investments by the ‘supply-side’ manufacturers that might produce and sell 
them (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Olson, 2013b).  
When green technology investment and consumption are thought to be inadequate for 
meeting the future energy and/or environmental needs of society, it is often deemed a market 
failure that creates incentives for governments to intervene (Greene, German and Deluchi 2009; 
Grossman, 2009).  Environmentalists and government policy makers typically promote green 
subsidies and supports to correct two underlying causes of green technology unattractiveness that 
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can lead to market failures.  First, non-green alternatives can have an unfair cost advantage due 
to their failure to pay for negative externalities in the form of ‘free’ discharges of greenhouse 
gases and other pollutants (Langniss and Praetorius, 2006).  Second, relatively new green 
technologies may require ‘temporary’ start-up subsidies to allow green industries to effectively 
compete with older conventional alternatives that benefit from technology advancements and 
accumulated learning and scale effects built over decades of use (Kahouli-Brahmi, 2009).   Thus 
market failure is the justification used for a variety of policies implemented by governments 
around the world to reduce the environmental impact of automobiles and spur faster green 
vehicle development and diffusion.  Such policies can typically be divided between the supply-
side, which focus on technology development and commercialization, and the demand-side that 
focus on end users.  Both the supply-side and demand-side can be further divided into policies 
designed to directly help green vehicle technology by means of research grants, loan guarantees, 
and tax credits (a.k.a. Pigouvian subsidies), or indirectly help by penalizing ‘dirty’ conventional 
ICVs with tougher emission and fuel economy regulations, and increasing fuel/vehicle taxes 
(a.k.a. Pigouvian taxes) (Beggs, 2013; DOE, 2011; Gecan, 2012; Olson and Thjømoe, 2010).   
The Norwegian example presents a unique case not only due to the generous BEV 
subsidies and relative success in spurring BEV adoption, but also because it provides the cleanest 
possible means for isolating the costs of green vehicle policies and the specific environmental 
and societal benefits they are designed to achieve.  The ability to link specific green vehicle 
public policies to specific outcomes in most countries is difficult, because subsidies are 
frequently linked to not only environmental benefits, but also other policy goals such as energy 
independence and support for green automotive sector jobs (DOE, 2011; Skerlos and Winebrake, 
2010).  In Norway, energy independence is irrelevant as the country is already a major exporter 
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of carbon-based fuels and electricity.  Similarly, the desire to support local green automotive jobs 
is also largely irrelevant given Norway’s small home market, relative lack of automotive 
manufacturing history and capabilities, and generally high labor and material costs.  A direct link 
between BEV public policy and emission reductions is also simplified by the fact that 99% of 
Norway’s electricity is non-greenhouse gas emitting hydro-generated, which means BEV 
adoption does not shift emissions from a vehicle’s tailpipe to the smokestack of a carbon-fueled 
electricity generating plant (Hawkins et al., 2012).   
All current Norwegian BEV supports are demand-side focused, which started with the 
abolishment of BEV import taxes and reduced registration fees in 1990, and were completed by 
granting permission for BEV use of mass-transit lanes in 2003 (EVN, 2014).  Recent analysis 
finds that Norwegian subsidies have been successful in erasing the financial penalties of BEV 
ownership versus ICVs, although technology related barriers such as short-range remain an 
obstacle to more widespread BEV adoption (Klif, 2006; Kvisle, 2010a; Mock and Yang, 2014).  
In contrast, other markets have used electric vehicle supports to address both supply-side and 
demand-side elements due to broader policy goals that include greater energy self-sufficiency 
and the creation of green industry jobs (Gecan, 2012).  For example, U.S. supply-side supports 
include the 2007 Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing program designed to provide 
development money for automakers and their suppliers, while the demand-side is incorporated in 
the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that provides federal income tax credits of 
$7,500 for BEV purchasers (DOE, 2011).    
Three years after the enactment of the electric vehicle tax credits, the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) released one of the few publicly available studies examining the cost 
effectiveness of the electric vehicle public policies in achieving stated goals (Gecan, 2012).  
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Using hypothetical comparisons between BEVs and ICVs of various sizes and types, the CBO 
analysis found the $7,500 tax credit to be insufficient to overcome current BEV lifetime cost 
disadvantages to US consumers, and that eliminating greenhouse gas emissions by means of 
BEV adoption was expensive at a calculated cost of up to $4,400 per CO2 equivalent ton (Gecan, 
2012).  It is therefore not surprising that 3 years after implementing the tax-credits, electric 
vehicle share of the U.S. new car market was 1.3% during 2013, which includes both plug-in 
hybrids and BEVs, and is below the share necessary to achieve the one-million electric vehicle 
goal by 2015 (DOE, 2011; EDTA, 2013; Mock and Yang, 2014).  Thus is would appear that 
Norway’s higher demand-side BEV subsidies are at least partly responsible for its global 
leadership in per capita BEV sales, but the unanswered questions that will be addressed in the 
next sections are: at what cost, and does Norway provide a policy model that others can follow?   
 
3.0 Method 
The calculation of the economic and environmental costs and benefits of Norwegian BEV 
subsidies employs comparisons between the two dominant selling BEVs and closely matched 
ICVs, which is a common method of assessing the relative attractiveness of green vehicles in 
many previous studies (e.g. Funk and Rabl, 1999; Gecan, 2012; Mock and Yang, 2014; Olson, 
2013a).  Financial metrics taken from earlier green subsidy research are utilized here to evaluate 
the cost effectiveness of Norwegian BEV subsidies, and include return on investment (ROI), and 
cost per ton reduction in CO2 equivalent emissions, both based on the estimated subsidy costs 
and financial valuations of the benefits derived from projected emission reductions (Gecan, 
2012; Olson, 2013b; Tol, 2008). 
 11 
The data utilized for this analysis is based on an extensive search of Norwegian public 
policy documents related to the transport sector in general and BEV supports specifically; 
together with recent government agency and industry data reflecting current taxes/fees, vehicle 
and fuel prices, and other operating costs, which have been converted from Norwegian kroner to 
U.S. dollars based on current exchange rates (e.g. Climate Cure, 2010; EVN, 2014; Klif, 2006; 
OFV, 2014; Sft, 2008).  In analyzing the cost effectiveness of the Norwegian BEV subsidies, the 
study also addresses two weaknesses of the CBO analysis of U.S. electric vehicle tax credits.  
First, the CBO analysis compares hypothetical BEVs and ICVs, while the current study uses the 
actual fuel use, emission levels, and other relevant specifications of the most popular BEVs and 
their ICV competitors.  Second, the CBO analysis does not consider the revenue losses from 
gasoline taxes not paid by BEV owners who ‘refuel’ with more lightly taxed electricity, while 
the current study accounts for all BEV policy related effects on various government revenue 
sources.   
The focus of the current study are the costs associated with achieving reductions in CO2, 
NOx, and Particulates emissions through electrification of the country’s vehicle fleet, which is 
the stated goal of Norwegian BEV policy (Climate Cure, 2010).  Since the government already 
collects carbon taxes of approximately $0.14 per liter of gasoline and diesel, and nearly 100% of 
Norway’s electricity is hydro-generated, the analysis makes the realistic assumption that 
upstream emission damages for vehicle fuels are either non-existent (hydroelectricity) or already 
paid for.  This together with the fact that there is no current Norwegian ICV or BEV assembly, 
and therefore zero emissions from local vehicle manufacturing, means that calculating the 
emission reduction results from vehicle electrification in Norway can be based entirely on 
comparisons between BEVs and ICVs on the targeted tailpipe emissions. 
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3.1 Comparison Vehicles 
Utilizing the comparison format from Olson (2015), the baseline scenario assumes that 
BEV buyers, in the absence of subsidies, would otherwise purchase an ICV of similar size and 
capability, which is reflected by the comparison vehicle specifications displayed in table 1.  The 
top selling Nissan Leaf and Tesla Model S, which represent 77% of 2013 Norwegian BEV sales, 
are each compared with the two top selling ICV competitors offering the most similar size and 
performance.  The Leaf’s ICV competitors are the Toyota Auris gas-electric hybrid (2nd best 
selling vehicle in Norway during 2013), and the top selling VW Golf diesel.  The Tesla’s 
competitors are the BMW 5-series diesel, the top selling large luxury ICV in Norway, and the 
VW Passat diesel, the best selling large ICV in Norway during 2013 (11th best overall).  Vehicle 
size based sales weights are applied to overall emission and financial results reporting, which 
reflect the relative 2013 sales of the Leaf sized BEVs, with 85% share, and Tesla sized BEVs 
accounting for the remaining 15%. 
Table 1 about here 
 
3.2 Scenarios 
 
 A variety of scenarios utilizing differing annual mileage, vehicle life, subsidy use and 
cost assumptions are employed for estimating the amount and value of emission reductions, and 
the costs of Norwegian BEV subsidies.  Lifetime vehicle emission reductions due to the 
conversion from ICV to BEV are dependent on assumptions regarding vehicle annual mileage 
and age at scrapping.    In Norway, the typical ICV is scrapped at age 18, but previous lifecycle 
studies have used shorter BEV life spans due to limited battery longevity and high replacement 
costs (e.g. Funk and Rabl, 1999; Gecan, 2012).  Similarly, the average Norwegian ICV is driven 
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15,000 kilometers annually (9,300 miles), but most previous studies estimate lower annual 
mileage for BEVs due to lengthy recharging periods and assumed predominance of slow speed 
city usage.  Thus all scenarios employ two vehicle life conditions for emission calculations: 1) 
short-life: 10,000 km x 10 years, and 2) normal- ‘ICV’ life: 15,000 km x 18 years.   
Subsidy cost estimation requires accounting for both the ‘fixed’ (i.e. not use dependent) 
and ‘variable’ (i.e. use dependent) subsidies provided to BEV owners, and tax expenditure versus 
direct expenditure costs to the government.  Tax expenditure subsidies are those that involve no 
‘out-of-pocket’ expenses, and thus do not result in government revenue losses unless the BEV 
directly substitutes for a non-subsidized ICV purchase.  For example, 93% of all BEVs are 
registered within commuting distance of the four largest Norwegian cities, including 67% in the 
Oslo area, which suggests that some BEV purchases are serving as an extra household vehicle 
for city commuting, and therefore is not serving as the primary household vehicle that substitutes 
for an ICV purchase (Holtsmark, 2012; Vidal, 2014).  Direct expenditures are those that involve 
‘out-of-pocket’ government expense even when the BEV does not substitute for an ICV 
purchase, and all scenarios assume that 100% of the ‘free’ parking and electricity provided to 
BEV owners is paid by the government to private suppliers, and are therefore the only direct 
expenditure subsidies.  The BEV exemption for purchase taxes and reduction in business car 
taxes are classified as fixed tax expenditures, while the BEV reductions in road taxes and road 
toll exemptions are variable tax expenditures, and the ‘free’ parking and electricity for battery 
recharging are variable direct expenditures.       
Variable subsidy cost valuations are based on assumptions about vehicle use and subsidy 
lifespan.   The low and normal vehicle annual mileage conditions employed in the emissions 
calculation section are used again here, but with the added scenario components of low and 
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normal variable subsidy use, which are assumed to be annually constant throughout life of the 
subsidies.  Norway’s current BEV subsidies are scheduled to end after the first 50,000 BEVs are 
sold or until 2018, whichever occurs first (Vidal, 2014), thus current subsidies have a maximum 
life of 4 years or less depending on when the BEV is purchased.  The low use scenario employs 
figures from a 2006 study by the Norwegian Climate and Pollution Agency, which assumes 
weekly free parking and road tolls valued at $5.25 and $5.08 respectively, roughly equivalent to 
about 1 hour of parking and 2 road tolls per week (Klif, 2006).  The high use scenario assumes 
15 hours of parking (3 hours per work day), and 5 road tolls per week, as might be expected 
when BEVs are used by daily commuters.  The low use scenario assumes zero use of this free 
recharging (i.e. all recharging is done with owner paid electricity at home), while the normal use 
scenario assumes 33% of BEV recharging is from free public sources valued at the VAT-free 
price of $0.20 per kWh.  Another important BEV operating-benefit is the permission to use the 
collective lanes normally reserved for public transit vehicles and taxis, which allows BEV 
drivers to avoid rush hour congestion common in major Norwegian cities.  For purposes of this 
analysis no financial value is given to this subsidy, as there is currently no direct cost to the 
government in providing it, although traffic studies suggest that higher BEV penetration may 
come at the cost of reducing public transit bus speeds and schedule reliability (Halvorsen and 
Froyen, 2009).   
Baseline valuations of both the fixed and variable BEV subsidy costs to the Norwegian 
government are determined by the total value of BEV exempted taxes and fees that would 
otherwise be paid by a comparable ICV buyer.  Both the low and normal subsidy use scenarios 
employ two subsidy lifespan values; 1) a 4-year subsidy life on the variable subsidies reflecting 
the value received by current BEV buyers, and 2) a 1-year subsidy life received by BEV buyers 
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during the last year of subsides.  Within both of these subsidy life conditions, three further 
subsidy cost variations are utilized: a) 1 for 1 BEV-ICV substitution (i.e. each new BEV replaces 
a similar ICV purchase), b) 1 in 10 BEV-ICV substitution (i.e. 90% of BEV purchases are extra 
household vehicles), and c) counting only direct expenditures EV subsidies for ‘free’ parking and 
‘free’ electricity.   
 
4.0 Annual and Lifetime Emission Results 
The calculated annual and lifetime CO2, NOx, and Particulate emissions reported in table 
2 are based on the respective average emissions per kilometer reported for the four comparison 
IVCs in table 1.  Note that BEV tailpipe emissions are assumed to be zero, while the three types 
of ICV emissions are reported in CO2 equivalent figures.  CO2 equivalent values are used to 
simplify reporting and are based on multiplying the raw NOx and Particulate emission levels by 
their damage per ton relationship to CO2 emissions based on figures from the Norwegian 
Pollution Control Authority (Sft, 2008).  This Sft report estimates that the environmental damage 
and social costs (i.e. human illnesses, premature deaths) associated with each metric ton of CO2, 
NOx, and Particulate emissions in typical Norwegian driving conditions at $49.18, $8,197, and 
$172,131 respectively. This means the CO2 equivalence for NOx emissions is calculated by 
multiplying tons of NOx tailpipe emissions by the conversion factor of 167 (i.e. $8,197 / $49.18 
= 167).  Thus, under vehicle life conditions 1 and 2, the calculated average lifetime CO2 
equivalent emissions for the four comparison ICVs are 12.03 and 32.48 tons respectively.  These 
ICV emissions are considerably lower than the figures used in early ICV-BEV comparisons (e.g. 
Funk and Rabl, 1999), largely due to steady reductions in ICV fuel use and emissions caused by 
improved ICV technology during the intervening period.  These improvements are reflected by 
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the drop in average CO2 emissions for new cars sold in Norway, which has gone from 300g/km 
in 1990 to 113 g/km in 2014 (OFV, 2014).   
Table 2 about here 
 
4.1 Damage Costs from Emissions 
Estimating the value of eliminating the ICV emissions by means of BEV substitution is 
achieved by multiplying the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority estimate of $49.18 per ton 
for damages by the lifetime CO2 equivalent tons, which yields vehicle lifetime valuations of 
$1,066 and $1,600 under the short and normal vehicle life conditions respectively (see table 2).  
These emission reduction valuations are now compared to the estimated valuations of Norwegian 
government BEV subsidy costs to determine if they are an economically sensible means of 
reducing the country’s greenhouse gas and pollutant emissions. 
5.0 BEV Fixed Subsidy Cost Results 
5.1 Purchase Tax Exemption    
 
Norway’s new car taxes, from which BEV are exempted, are among the highest in the 
world (Economist, 2011), and based on vehicle weight, horsepower, CO2 and NOx emissions, 
plus a 25% value-added-tax (VAT).  The purchase tax values reported for the comparison ICVs 
in table 2 are based on the Norwegian government’s new car tax calculator (Toll, 2014), and 
comprise between 34% and 53% of their retail prices.  Thus in comparison to similar ICVs, table 
2 shows that Norwegian BEV buyers receive a weighted average subsidy of $19,867, which is 
higher than the BEV purchase subsidies in other markets such as the USA ($7,500) and the UK 
(₤5,000), and is not dependent on the buyer’s taxable income as is the case with tax credit based 
subsidies (Gecan, 2012; Ingham, 2013).  
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5.2 BEV Business Car Income Tax Adjustment Subsidy 
As compensation for personal use of a business car, Norwegians that receive a new ICV 
from their employer must add 25% of the car’s retail price to their income for each of the car’s 
first 3 years of use.  This rate drops to 15% from year 4 until the car is sold by the employer, but 
in reality most business cars are only kept for 3 years before being replaced, which means the 
lower rate rarely applies.  The same tax rates apply for BEVs, but the subsidy is based on an 
assumed 50% reduction in the retail price of the car, thus a $30,000 BEV is considered a $15,000 
car for income tax adjustment purposes.  The income tax rates that must be paid on this extra 
‘business car’ income vary from 28% to 49% with the actual rate depending on income level and 
qualifying exemptions, but for this analysis a conservative tax rate of 30% is assumed.  Thus for 
purposes of this analysis, the business car income tax adjustment is halved for the 30% of current 
Norwegian BEV purchases that are used as business cars (Grønnbil, 2012).  Since the common 
practice is to replace business cars at age 3, this analysis further assumes the maximum business 
car tax adjustment benefit for the 4-year subsidy life scenarios and spreads it across all BEV cars 
at the proportional reduced rate.  Thus the business car tax reported in table 2 uses the following 
two formulas for calculating the business car subsidy per BEV business car (BCSpEVBC) and 
the business car subsidy per BEV (BCSpEV) respectively: 
BCSpEVBC = (car retail price * 50% BEV reduction)* income tax rate)) 
BCSpEV= (BCSpEVBC * (30% BEV bus. cars / 100% BEV cars)). 
 
5.3 BEV Variable Rate Subsidies 
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The first variable subsidy is the reduction in the annual licensing fee from $407 for ICVs 
to $66 for BEVs.  Since BEVs do not use carbon-based fuels, they are also exempt from paying 
the associated motor fuel taxes, which include a road use tax of $0.76 and $0.59 per liter of 
gasoline and diesel respectively, a $0.14 per liter CO2 tax, and 25% VAT.  For purposes of this 
analysis the exclusion from paying CO2 taxes on fuel are not included as BEV subsidies, since 
the purpose of the tax is to account for the oil well to gas pump emission damage of the fuels.    
Instead of buying taxed diesel or gasoline, a Norwegian BEV user can benefit from over 
5,000 free recharging facilities around the country (EVN, 2014).  This allows BEV owners to 
escape the $0.26 per kWh average electricity price (including 25% VAT) for the portion of their 
battery recharging they do away from home (Eurostat, 2014).  The value of the VAT paid on 
owner supplied electricity and the value of the free recharge electricity is subtracted from the 
value of the ICV carbon-fuel tax exemptions.  The ‘free’ electricity analysis does not include, 
however, any government ‘start-up’ expenditures related to the installation of the recharging 
facilities around the country that supply the free electricity, since their lifespan cannot be easily 
predicted, nor the costs reliably allocated to a non-fixed population of BEVs.   Among the BEV 
operating-benefits, the exemptions from paying road tolls and parking fees can be very 
financially valuable when BEVs are used in daily commutes to congested city centers 
(Holtsmark, 2012).  As with the ‘free’ electricity, however, the ‘free’ parking benefit is assumed 
to involve ‘out-of-pocket’ direct expenditures as the government compensates private suppliers 
for the lost revenue.   
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5.4 Total Subsidy Costs 
Table 3 presents the subsidy scenario valuation results, which in the 4 year baseline 1 for 
1 BEV-ICV substitution condition range from $27,861 per BEV in the short vehicle life and low 
subsidy use scenario, to $47,650 in the average vehicle life average subsidy use scenario.  In the 
4 year 1 in 10 BEV substitution condition, the subsidy valuations range from $5,671 to $24,252 
per BEV, while the direct expenditure 4 year totals range from $3,205 to $21,652.  The 
elimination of the purchase taxes is by far the biggest single component of the overall BEV 
subsidy, with a sales weighted average value representing 60% of the ICV retail price, 91% of 
the total subsidy costs in the low use scenario 1 year condition, and 74% in the average use 
scenario 1 year condition.  The direct expenditure BEV subsidy elements, which are comprised 
of the government paid ‘free parking’ and ‘free electricity’ account for approximately 4% to 21% 
of the total subsidy costs in the low and average use scenarios respectively. 
 
6.0 Subsidy Costs versus Emission Reduction Benefits 
The comparison of BEV subsidy valuations over either the 1 or 4 year conditions from 
table 3, with the valuations of BEV emission reduction benefits over the 10 or 18 year vehicle 
life from table 2, are used to calculate the BEV subsidy return-on-investment (ROI) based on the 
formula:     
BEV Subsidy ROI = (Value of BEV Emission Reduction – Value of BEV subsidies) 
                 Value of the BEV subsidies 
 
As reported in table 3, ROIs in the low subsidy use scenario conditions range from 99.8% 
of the average vehicle life scenario and 1 year direct expenditure condition, to –96.2% in the 
short vehicle life 4 year subsidy 1 to 1 replacement condition, while in the average subsidy use 
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scenario conditions, ROIs range from –70.4% to –97.7%. Thus only in scenario conditions where 
subsidy use is minimized, short in duration (1 year), and only direct expenditure subsidy costs 
are counted, is the valuation of the subsidies below the valuations provided by 10 to 18 years of 
lower CO2 equivalent emissions from BEV adoption.  In all other scenario conditions, the 
subsidy valuations are substantially higher than the estimated value of emission reduction, and 
result in negative ROIs.   
Table 3 about here 
In terms of BEV subsidy costs per ton of CO2 equivalent emission reduction, the values 
range from $25 per ton in the average vehicle life and low subsidy use scenario under the 1 year 
direct expenditure condition, to $3,902 per ton under the short vehicle life and average subsidy 
use scenario and 4 year 1 to 1 condition (see table 3).  Only the $25 per ton condition is below 
the $49.18 value per ton used by Norwegian public policy documents to support the BEV 
subsidies, and the $50 per ton (or less) valuations from various international studies of the 
economic, social, and environmental damages caused by greenhouse gas emissions (Sft, 2008; 
Tol, 2007).  All other scenario conditions have cost per ton figures that are substantially higher 
than the valuation placed on the health and environmental benefits derived from BEV related 
emission reductions.  
 
7.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
Although many governments around the world provide BEV subsidies as a means 
achieving environmental public policy goals, they have generally not been successful in 
achieving widespread BEV adoption by car buyers (Mock and Yang, 2014).  Norway’s relatively 
successful BEV subsidies might therefore be seen as a model for other nations to follow for 
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achieving substantial BEV adoption.  Unfortunately the current analysis suggests that under all 
but the most generous to BEV policy assumptions, the financial value of the environmental 
benefits derived from electrification of Norway’s vehicle fleet is far smaller than the cost of the 
BEV subsidies.  Furthermore, the generally very negative financial payoffs regarding Norwegian 
BEV subsidies are derived from analysis of conditions that in many ways are a ‘best case’ 
scenario for BEVs, because they do not include several common BEV related emission and 
subsidy cost items that would likely worsen the BEV subsidy ROI in other markets.  The first is 
that a significant portion of the electricity needed for recharging BEV batteries in most countries 
will come from carbon-fuel based electricity generation plants, which would transfer some 
portion of the eliminated tailpipe emissions to the electricity generating plant and consequently 
reduce the BEV emission reduction benefits versus ICVs (Anair and Mahmassani, 2012; 
Hawkins et al., 2012).   
Second, this analysis limits the ROI calculation to only the Norwegian government’s 
BEV policy goals, which focus solely on vehicle emissions occurring in Norway.  This means 
the analysis does not include greenhouse gases and other pollutants from the foreign manufacture 
of BEVs.  Recent life-cycle analysis studies have found that the manufacture of BEVs and their 
batteries can emit 50 to 125% more CO2 equivalent tons than comparable ICV manufacturing, 
and that making-up this BEV manufacturing deficit would require many years of zero-emission 
BEV driving (Hawkins, et al., 2012; Patterson et al., 2011).  Thus under the short vehicle life 
scenario utilized here, global life-cycle emissions for a BEV could be higher than a comparable 
ICV, even though the BEV provides a local (Norwegian) reduction in tailpipe emissions.  
Furthermore, the ‘off-shoring’ of BEV manufacturing emissions is also magnified in cases where 
BEV sales result in a net addition to the national vehicle fleet size, even though the 1 in 10 
 22 
substitution conditions utilized here resulted in a somewhat less unattractive financial outcomes 
for the Norwegian BEV subsidies. It should also be noted that the U.S. CBO study did not 
calculate the differential energy use and emissions from BEV versus ICV manufacturing, even 
though a stated U.S. goal for the program is to support American BEV manufacturing (Gecan, 
2012).  The failure to include total life-cycle analysis in calculating BEV subsidy ROI provides 
an example of national pro-environmental public policies being potentially at odds with global 
pro-environmental goals, a topic that has received scant attention in the public policy and 
environmental literatures (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). 
Third, this analysis did not include the ‘start-up’ costs and emissions associated with the 
installation of battery charging infrastructure.  Although not an issue in Norway, where the 
current hydroelectricity supply and grid are thought to be capable of handling the power needs of 
a large BEV fleet, other countries might also need to invest in expensive power generation and 
electrical grid expansion to accommodate BEVs (Hagman, Assum, and Amundsen, 2011; 
Pooley, 2010).  Such additional ‘start-up’ infrastructure investments, if financed or subsidized by 
governments, will further weaken the already unattractive BEV subsidy ROIs reported here.  
Finally, the scenarios do not consider sources of BEV customers beyond ICV 
purchasers/users.  For example, attractive BEV subsidies might encourage mass-transit users to 
trade-in their bus-passes for their own private BEV, and have negative effects on mass-transit 
passenger load factors.  This is supported by a survey finding that Norwegian BEV owners use 
public transit for commuting at a 75% lower rate than non-BEV owners (Halvorsen and Froyen, 
2009).  Although some studies suggest that mass-transit buses and trains are not necessarily 
‘greener’ than BEVs and hybrid ICVs, such conclusions are dependent on low passenger load-
factors and the use of dirty mass-transit fuels and vehicles (Kvisle, 2010b; O’Toole, 2008).  
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Since mass-transit systems are frequently owned or subsidized by governments, and cannot be 
eliminated due to the need to serve the non-driving public, the loss of fare-paying customers via 
BEV owners deserting the system may decrease operating revenues with detrimental economic 
and environmental impacts, and thus would also likely dampen the ROI of BEV subsidies.  
 
7.1 Public Policy Implications 
Norway is a world leader in both BEV subsidies and BEV sales per capita (Mock and 
Yang, 2014).  Few other countries, however, are likely to have the means to provide similar 
subsidy levels, which are affordable in large part due to the taxes on North Sea oil and natural 
gas that account for almost 30% of the Norwegian government’s revenue (Doyle and Adomaitis, 
2013).  Another major source of tax revenue that helps pay for the generous BEV subsidies 
comes from Norway’s high ICV related taxes that typically generate over 10% of government 
revenues.  BEV exemptions from paying vehicle related taxes and fees means that most of the 
Norwegian subsidies are tax expenditures that involve little out-of-pocket expense for the 
government.  For a variety of cultural and historic reasons, Norwegians are generally accepting 
of their high car-related tax burdens, but unless other countries are able to raise fuel and vehicle 
taxes to Norwegian levels in order to provide tax expenditure based subsidies, emulating 
Norway’s generous BEV subsidies will require huge direct expenditures.  For example, the tax-
exempt price for the Nissan Leaf is 7% lower than the tax inclusive price of the ICV comparison 
vehicles in Norway, but 46% more expensive the tax-free price, which together with the 
operating-cost subsidies makes the Leaf a relative bargain to Norwegian car buyers (see table 1).  
In comparison, the UK retail price of Leaf is 42% more expensive than the comparison Auris and 
Golf, and still 17% more expensive after subtracting the £5,000 BEV subsidy, which is an direct 
 24 
expenditure for the UK government that has not been successful in convincing significant 
number of UK car buyers to adopt BEVs (Ingham, 2013).  To provide a similar BEV pricing 
discount as allowed by Norway’s tax expenditure purchase tax exemption, would require the UK 
government to more than double their current ‘out-of-pocket’ BEV subsidy.  Similarly, 
Norway’s high motor fuel taxes make gasoline more than 300% more expensive than in the U.S., 
while Norwegian electricity prices are more similar, making BEV ‘fuel’ savings comparably 
more attractive in Norway (Mock and Yang, 2014).  Other countries that also have high motor 
fuel taxes, but which also heavily subsidize renewable energy, such as Germany and Denmark, 
thwart the relative attractiveness of electricity as a substitute motor fuel because the high costs of 
renewable power increase electricity prices to rates that are 50% higher than Norway (Mock and 
Yang, 2014; Myhrvold, 2011).  Thus subsidies that promote renewable energy may cancel out 
much of the BEV fuel cost benefit, which may provide at least a partial explanation for 
Denmark’s 0.5% BEV share of new car sales while offering BEV subsidies that are almost as 
generous as Norway’s (Mock and Yang, 2014). 
Although Norway’s generous tax-expenditure funded subsidies make BEV ownership 
more competitive with ICVs, the much lower BEV penetration rates in other countries with less 
generous BEV subsidies would suggest that Norwegian BEV market share may drop 
dramatically when the subsidies expire in 2018 (Vidal, 2014).  Yet continuance of generous BEV 
subsidies may jeopardize the automotive tax revenues that are an important funding source for 
public spending needs.  For example, the BEV exemption from paying road tolls means BEV 
drivers do not contribute towards the revenue source that pays for 50% of road construction and 
maintenance costs in Norway, while road tolls and motor fuel taxes are also commonly used by 
governments around the world to fund both roads and mass-transit systems (Styles, 2009).  The 
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loss of such funding could force governments to find new ways of generating vehicle-based 
revenues such as mileage-based taxation that might also hit BEV users and reduce BEV 
attractiveness unless technology improvements can reduce the need for subsidies (Doyle and 
Adomaitis, 2013; Krishen et al., 2010).    
Figure 1 about here 
The need for BEV technology and product improvements is reinforced by the BEV sales 
history in Norway as displayed in figure 1.  While the Norwegian government has offered its 
current mix of generous BEV subsidies since 2003, BEV sales were until recently only a few 
hundred units per year or less (EVN, 2014).  For example, the BEV annual sales average was 
323 units during 2008 and 2009, which accounted for 0.3% of the new car market (OFV, 2014).  
It was not until the 2011 market introductions of the Mitsubishi I-MIEV and Nissan Leaf that 
BEV sales took off towards the current world leading levels.  Previous BEV models such as the 
Think City were small 2-passenger vehicles with modest range, very low driving performance, 
few luxuries, and relatively high prices even with the purchase tax exemption.  The Leaf and I-
MIEV, with 4 passenger seating, highway speed capability, ‘normal’ luxury appointments such 
climate-control and electric windows, and a competitive price (with subsidy), were the first 
BEVs that could substitute for a ‘regular’ ICV within the confines of their still limited range and 
body style selection.   
Yet the current subsidies when combined with the introduction of more attractive BEV 
models such as the Leaf and Tesla have yielded a Norwegian BEV penetration that has reached 
only 6% of new car sales, which means they can still be defined as a niche product.  This 
suggests that the mass-market is still concerned about the unresolved BEV disadvantages 
highlighted in table 1; namely driving range, recharging time, and poor resale value (Holtsmark, 
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2012; Stevens, 2011; Spiegel, 2012).   Driving range and recharging time have been BEV 
problems for over 100 years, and Norway’s cold winters further reduce the battery’s ability to 
store energy (Lane, 2011).  Uncertain battery life is also the major reason for the low resale value 
of BEVs, as battery replacement costs can easily exceed the second-hand value of the car, which 
is a big BEV handicap when depreciation is already the single biggest cost of car ownership 
(Gertner, 2011; Lange, 2012; Magnussen, 2012).  Although depreciation figures are not available 
in Norway, in the UK the projected 3-year depreciation is about 30% greater for the BEVs than 
the comparison ICVs (see table 1).  Until technology improvements greatly reduce these BEV 
disadvantages, it can be argued that low BEV demand is not a sign of market failure, but a 
rational decision on the part of mainstream buyers to choose ‘brown’ alternatives that offer better 
value even after the societal costs of their emissions are considered.  Thus unless foreseeable 
technology improvements and price reductions can eliminate most BEV disadvantages, it is 
unlikely that the generally negative BEV subsidy ROIs found here can turn positive, which raises 
questions regarding the political viability of maintaining taxpayer support for BEV subsidies 
(Olson, 2013b).   
Public policy makers often promote green subsidies as a means for developing a market 
of sufficient size to give manufacturers the economies of scale necessary to compete with 
‘brown’ alternatives (Grossman, 2009; Holtsmark, 2012; Myhrvold, 2011).  In the context of 
Norway’s small car market, where even the best selling ICV model has less than 10,000 sales 
annually, such demand-side BEV subsidies are unlikely to have much effect on BEV economies 
of scale globally when profitability typically requires several hundred thousand unit sales per 
year.  Low sales in major auto markets are the reason currently available BEVs are generally 
thought to be money losers for their manufacturers (Henkel, 2014; Pyper, 2013; Tung, 2013), 
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which again reinforces the need for dramatic improvements in BEV technology before they can 
be profitably sold to consumers with small or zero subsidies.  Unfortunately this need for 
improved technology is also a conclusion from BEV studies that are over 10 years old (e.g. 
Delucchi and Lipman, 2001; Funk and Rabl, 1999).  In part, the failure of BEVs to close the 
performance and cost gap with ICVs during the intervening period is due to the improving fuel 
economy and decreasing emissions of modern ICVs, as manufacturers have adopted fuel saving 
technologies such as turbocharging, direct fuel injection, stop-start systems, lightweight 
materials, and aerodynamic styling (Olson, 2013b).  This suggests that government revenues 
directed at demand-side BEV subsidies in Norway and elsewhere might more profitably be 
employed on the supply-side, with a particular focus on BEV related R&D that could close 
performance and cost gaps with ever improving ICVs (Hargadon and Kenney, 2012; Lomborg, 
2013; Olson, 2015).   
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Table 1
Comparison Vehicles
Sources:  specification data from manufacturer websites. (1) Leaf competitors 85% and Tesla competitors 15% weighting (2): Norwegian 
sales from ofvas.no. (3): Auris 99 taxable hp, 134 total hp. (4): fuel use for EVs is based on btu energy conversion from electricity  
consumption to equivalent amount of gasoline per mile. (5): Depreciation from www.whatcar.com. 
2013 Norwegian Sales (2)
2013 Sales Rank
Norwegian Retail Price 
Tax-Free Retail Price 
length (mm)
weight (kilo)
horsepower (3)
0-60 mph (sec)
top speed (mph)
fuel use (mpg) (4)
maximum driving range (miles)
refueling time (minutes)
3 yr depreciation % (UK) (5)
Nissan Toyota VW
Leaf Auris Golf
electric gas-el hyb. diesel
4,604 4,818 7,366
3 2 1
$39,457 $43,574 $41,164
$39,457 $28,910 $25,124
4,375 4,275 4,255
1,546 1,310 1,295
107 136/99 90
11.9 10.9 11.9
91 113 115
112 62 62
100 464 503
420 5 5
74% 62% 49%
Tesla BMW VW
S 85 530d Passat
electric diesel diesel
1,983 1,285 2,997
20 32 11
$85,738 $114,066 $70,377
$85,738 $53,847 $39,691
4,970 4,899 4,771
2,190 1,710 1,526
362 258 140
5.6 6.0 10.0
125 156 130
90 41 45
300 469 520
600 5 5
64% 61% 56%
Weighted BEV %
ICV of 
avg. (1) ICV
5,499 77%
 
$49,847 93%
$29,980 155%
4,351 103%
1,350 122%
106 115%
10.9 101%
118 81%
59 184%
485 27%
5 8940%
56% 130%
CO2 g/km
NOx g/km
Particulate g/km
0 87 99
0 0 0.012
0 0.001 0.005
0 134 135
0 0.04 0.012
0 0.005 0.005
99 0%
0.0090 0%
0.0033 0%
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Table 2
Overall Emission and Annual Subsidy Results for ICV comparison vehicles
(1) ICV = weighted 85% Leaf comparison ICVs + 15% Tesla comparison ICVs average from table 1, (2) 18 years @ 15k = Norwegian ICV 
average, (3) low subsidy use = weekly tolls = 2 @ $5.08 per toll and 1 hour parking @ $5.25 and 0% free recharging; high subsidy use = weekly 5 
tolls and 15 hours per parking and 33% free recharging @ $.256 Kwh, (4) CO2 equivalent = actual tons * (damage value per kilo / damage value 
per kilo CO2), lifetime emissions = 10 or 18 years, damage per ton USD conversion at $49.18 per ton from SFT (2008), (5) purchase taxes from 
Norwegian imported car tax calculator (Toll, 2014); Business car tax = 25% of car retail price * income bracket tax rate, with assumed 30% tax 
bracket (BEV owners get 50% reduction in this rate); Road Tax = $473 for gasoline and diesel cars, $66 for BEV; Fuel Taxes $.76 and $.59 per 
liter of gasoline and diesel respectively + 20% VAT on May 2014 Norwegian fuel prices. 
.
Vehicle Type (1)
Vehicle life expectancy (2)
EV Subsidy Use (3)
EMISSIONS: (4)
annual CO2 tons
annual NOx tons (C02 equivalent) 
annual Particulates tons (C02 equivalent)
Annual Emission Tons (C02 equivalent) 
Lifetime Emission Tons (C02 equivalent)
Lifetime Emission Damages (USD)
ICV ICV
10 yrs 18 yrs
low normal
0.992 1.488
0.001 0.001
0.00003 0.00005
1.203 1.805
12.030 32.481
$1,065 $1,597
SUBSIDIES: (5)
Car Purchase Taxes
Annual Business Car Tax
Annual Road Taxes
Annual Fuel Taxes
Annual Road Tolls
Annual Parking Fees
$19,867 $19,867
$561 $561
$407 $407
$197 $532
$529 $1,321
$273 $4,092
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Table 3
BEV Subsidy Valuations, ROI, and $ Per CO2 Equivalent Ton Reduced
(1) Short vehicle life emissions calculated for 10 years @ 10K km; (2) Emission calculated over 18 years @ 15K km 2 notes. (3-4) from table 2;  
(5) Low Subsidy Use Scenarios = 2 free tolls, 1 hour free parking per week; 4 yr 1 to 1 = 4 year subsidy life and each BEV purchase substituting 
for a similar ICV purchase; 4 yr 1 in 10 = 4 year subsidy life and 1 BEV in 10 substituting for a similar ICV purchase; 4 yr direct expenditure = 4 
years subsidy life, but only counting free parking and electricity; 1 yr conditions are identical except for 1 year subsidy life.  (6) Average Subsidy 
Use Scenarios = 5 free tolls, 15 hours parking per week, 33% free electricity; 4 year and 1 year scenario conditions are otherwise identical to low 
subsidy descriptions above.  ROI = (Emission reduction value-Subsidy value)/Subsidy value. $ per ton = subsidy value / emission reduction tons.
 
 Low Subsidy Use Scenario (5) Value
4 yr 1 to 1 $27,861
4 yr 1 in 10 $5,671
4 yr direct expenditure $3,205
1 yr 1 to 1 $21,833
1 yr 1 in 10 $2,917
1 yr direct expenditure $801
Average Subsidy Use Scenario (6)
4 yr 1 to 1 $46,939
4 yr 1 in 10 $24,181
4 yr direct expenditure $21,652
1 yr 1 to 1 $26,725
1 yr 1 in 10 $7,544
1 yr direct expenditure $5,413
Short Vehicle Life S  
Emission Reduction Value (3) $1,066
Emission Reduction Tons (4) 12.03
    (1) Average Vehicle Life Scenario (2)
$1,600
32.48
ROI $ per ton
-96.2% $2,316
-81.2% $471
-66.7% $266
-95.1% $1,815
-63.5% $242
33.1% $67
-97.7% $3,902
-95.6% $2,010
-95.1% $1,800
-96.0% $2,222
-85.9% $627
-80.3% $450
Value ROI $ per ton
$28,256 -94.3% $870
$5,710 -72.0% $176
$3,205 -50.1% $99
$22,055 -92.7% $679
$2,927 -45.3% $90
$801 99.8% $25
$47,650 -96.6% $1,467
$24,252 -93.4% $747
$21,652 -92.6% $667
$26,903 -94.1% $828
$7,562 -78.8% $233
$5,413 -70.4% $167
 
